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I
INTRODUCTION
The professional liability system has been criticized for a wide variety of
reasons, including its inefficiency and tendency to increase the costs of
medical care.' The system, however, can embody socially beneficial
incentives; 2 that is, liability for malpractice claims may encourage providers to
improve their performance to reduce future claims expense.
It is not certain, however, whether our system in fact provides incentives
for improved performance. If malpractice claims are perceived as essentially
random, then the system serves merely to compensate the injured party but
offers no incentives for medical care providers to reduce the risk of poor
patient outcomes. However, if specific risk factors that predict malpractice
exposure can be identified, then managers and insurers can act upon them to
reduce the risk and cost of claims.
Thus, while the notion that our liability system encourages improved
performance may have some intuitive appeal, arguments for it should be
based on good evidence of risk factors that explain variations in malpractice
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1. See, for example, Jeffrey O'Connell, Neo-.\o-Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated
Statutor' and Contractual Alternatives, 49 L & Contenp Probs 125, 125-27 (Spring 1986); Frank A. Sloan
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Associalion's Proposed Administrative lribunalfor .1Jedical .\Ialpiactice, I Cts, Health Sci & Law 19, 19
(1990).
2. See, for example, John E. Rolph, Some Statistical Evidence on Merit Rating in Medical Malpractice
Insurance, 48J Risk & Ins 247, 255-59 (1981).
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loss experience. This paper presents evidence of such risk factors for a
sample of California hospitals in the mid-1980s.
A. The Problem with Incentives in Existing Professional Liability
Insurance
Given the uncertainty surrounding the occurrence of a liability claim and
the large potential losses associated with some claims, it is understandable
that insurance would develop to spread the risk. However, by pooling risk,
insurance dilutes the incentives arising from malpractice claims for providers
of health care to prevent adverse events. Thus, while insurance provides a
benefit to providers by spreading their risk, this protection has a social cost in
the attenuation of economic incentives to improve performance.5
The malpractice liability insurance industry recognizes the incentive
effects of first-dollar coverage and the attendant "moral hazard. ' 4 Thus, in
order to create some incentives for good performance, a balance is often
struck between complete risk bearing by the provider and complete risk
shifting to the insurer. A simple mechanism for this balance is the use of a
deductible, whereby the hospital assumes all or a portion of the risk for claims
of less than a certain dollar amount, and the insurer provides coverage for
larger claims, which occur less frequently. 5 Experience rating of premiums is
another device that is used.6 In such cases, the premium in subsequent years
reflects prior experience. Finally, risk shifts to the health care provider if
hospital chains or affiliated institutions self-insure or establish a captive
insurer. 7
The problem with this balancing approach is that it is not based on specific
risk factors. Hospital malpractice insurance policies recognize some general
factors, but not other, more specific risk factors. For example, premiums for
hospital policies are often based on beds or average daily census, thus
reflecting the number of patients "exposed." 8 Other general categories of
procedures, such as surgeries or deliveries, may also be factored into the
premiums. Insurance premiums, 9 however, tend not to be adjusted for other
3. See Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy 121 (Harvard U
Press, 1985); Frank A. Sloan, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Penny B. Githens, Insuring Medical Malpractice
300 (Oxford U Press, 1991).
4. See Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 119-22 (cited in note 3).
5. Id at 122-24.
6. See id; Blaine F. Nye & Alfred E. Hofflander, Experience Rating in Medical Professional Liability
Insurance, 55 J Risk & ins 150, 150-51 (March 1988); Frank A. Sloan, et al, Medical Malpractice
Experience of Physicians: Predictable or Haphazard?, 262 J Am Med Ass'n 3291, 3296 (1989); Sloan,
Bovbjerg & Githens, Insuring Medical Malpractice at 299 (cited in note 3).
7. See James R. Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985, 49 L & Contemp
Probs 36, 42-44 (Spring 1986).
8. See US Gen Acct'g Office, Medical Malpractice: Insurance Costs Increased but Varied Among
Physicians and Hospitals 38, 43-44 (September 1986) (GAO/HRD-86-112) ("GAO, Insurance Costs
Increased").
9. See Premium Rating Structure of California Hospital Association (November 1986)
(CHAIS/MIS 010 11/86).
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factors, such as the types of services offered, staffing patterns, or objectively
measured outcomes.
The principal difficulty with relying on the general incentives in the
current system is that they provide relatively little usable information for
hospital management. To the extent risk is borne by an insurer, there is little
reason to alter behavior. However, even in the extreme case in which 'a
hospital is completely self-insured, the information content implicit in claims
may be difficult to distinguish from "random noise." For example, in the
sample of hospitals reported on below, the average number of claims per
hospital per year was 7.4. A hospital administrator could not detect that the
number of claims in a certain area is higher than expected. The current
system also imposes substantial time lags. The costs associated with adverse
outcomes may take years to be adjudicated.' 0 If a problem is then recognized,
substantial additional time may be needed to correct the problem or close the
unit.
In sum, a more risk-sensitive approach to setting premiums may provide
insurers with a marketing advantage. If certain factors are associated with
increased risk of malpractice claims costs, insurers could lower their
premiums for hospitals with low-risk characteristics and raise them for
hospitals with high-risk characteristics. More importantly, however, such an
approach provides clear incentives for influencing hospital behavior before
patients are injured. For example, if anticipated average costs associated with
a new specialized unit are identified as add-ons to an annual policy, decisions
can be made prospectively. Thus, if hospital directors knew that the addition
of a certain type of special care unit would add substantially to the hospital's
malpractice premium, a proposal to add such a unit might be evaluated more
carefully.
The reallocation of premium costs to the class of higher risk institutions is
a step toward increasing the incentives associated with malpractice costs and
reducing the risk shifted to insurers. Its effects are potentially quite different
from those of a simple increase in deductibles, since the incentives for
hospitals to change behavior will be greater; that is, unlike deductibles, where
premiums are related to the average loss experience of all policyholders, this
approach bases premiums on individualized and particularized risk factors.
B. Selecting Potential Risk Factors
This study was designed as an initial test of the hypothesis that risk factors
could be identified that help explain the variability in hospital malpractice
claims. Ideally, such risk factors would be correlated with either the increased
frequency or the magnitude of claims. I The variables considered fall into
four groups: (1) the type of hospital; (2) the presence and volume of selected
10. See US Gen Acct'g Office, Medical Malpractice: Characteristics of Claims Closed in 1984, 33 (April
1987) (GAO/HRD-87-55) ("GAO, Characteristics of Claims").
1i. See Sloan, Bovbjerg & Githens, Insuring Medical Malpractice at 297-99 (cited in note 3).
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specialized services; (3) staffing and organizational patterns; and (4) objective
measures of patient outcomes.
1. Hospital Type. Hospital type may be a risk factor for several reasons. For
example, children's hospitals have case mixes substantially different from
those of general acute care hospitals. Because all their patients are children,
often with severe problems, the malpractice claims lodged against them are
also likely to be larger than average. Similarly, teaching hospitals may treat
more severely ill patients. The ownership of the hospital may also affect
either the occurrence or the size of claims. There is often a perception that
the quality of care is worse in public and proprietary hospitals than in
voluntary hospitals.' 2 Of course, the relation between quality of care and
malpractice claims is unclear.1 3
2. Presence and Volume of Specialized Services. A second set of potential risk
factors is that associated with the presence of selected types of services. For
example, a 24-hour emergency room will influence the volume and nature of
emergency cases seen at the hospital; this, in turn, may affect the number and
size of malpractice claims. Likewise, many hospitals do not offer maternity
services, and, therefore, they would not be at risk for claims arising from
deliveries. The presence of a high-risk obstetric care unit may place the
hospital at even greater risk of a suit because of the greater potential for a
poor outcome among high-risk deliveries.
Various measures of hospital size or patient volume are also likely to affect
claims experience. Clearly, a hospital with an average of 250 patients per day
will probably have more claims than a hospital with twenty-five patients a day.
This is a simple scale effect, and malpractice insurers typically quote
premiums in terms of dollars per average daily census or per bed. 14 The
effect of size, however, is complicated by the relationship between hospital
volume and patient outcomes. There is substantial evidence that for some
procedures and diagnoses, hospitals with relatively few such patients have
higher rates of deaths or complications.' 5 This suggests that, while larger
hospitals will typically have more claims, their claims rate may be lower than
one would expect based just on size if they have more experience than usual
with certain types of patients. Thus, one may find a separate effect
independent of the average number of patients in the hospital for factors such
as the number of deliveries, the number of surgical procedures, outpatient
visits to emergency rooms and other sites, and intensive care unit days.
12. See Stephen M. Shortell, Physician Involvement in Hospital Decision Making, in Bradford H.
Gray. ed, The New Health Care for Profit: Doctors and Hospitals in a Competitive Environment 91-92 (Nat'l
Acad Press, 1983).
13. See Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 19-24 (cited in note 3); Rolph. 48J Risk & Ins at 247 (cited
in note 2); Don H. Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study-A Technical Summary, 128 W J Med 360,
362-64 (1978).
14. See GAO, Insurance Costs Increased at 43-44 (cited in note 8).
15. See Harold S. Luft, et al, Hospital Volume, Physician Volume, and Patient Outcomes 97-108 (Health
Admin Press, 1990) ("Hospital Volume").
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3. Staffing and Organizational Patterns. Hospital staffing and organizational
patterns may also be risk factors. For example, one might expect that
hospitals with a higher percentage of board-certified medical staff would have
fewer claims. This might be the case for two reasons, even though the focus is
on claims against the hospital, rather than the physician. First, in many
instances the hospital is named as a defendant in suits in which the primary
allegation is against the physician. Second, board-certified physicians may
demand higher-quality support staff in the hospitals in which they practice.' 6
Another possible organizational risk factor may be the use of a physician who
is paid to serve as liaison between the medical staff and the hospital
management rather than a reliance on voluntary hospital-medical staff
communications. 17 Different patterns in support staffing may also affect
outcomes. For example, higher ratios of nurses per patient may result in
better outcomes.
4. Patient Outcomes. Thus far, all the potential risk factors have dealt with
measures of either the structure or the operation of the hospital, rather than
with direct measures of patient care quality. However, instead of focusing on
structural characteristics, which at best may be necessary but not sufficient for
high-quality medical care, one may also consider patient outcomes directly. It
is plausible that malpractice claims are associated with higher rates of poor
outcomes, but this hypothesis has not, to our knowledge, been previously
tested. A study reviewing hospital medical records found that approximately
90 percent of all potentially compensable events do not result in a malpractice
suit.' 8 While this indicates that most instances of poor quality do not result in
a suit, this does not eliminate the possibility of a positive association between
poor patient outcomes and malpractice claims.
Patient outcomes depend on many factors, including the patient's general
medical condition, the attendant risk of the treatment, and the skill of the
physician and hospital-based providers.' 9 While the likelihood of patient or
family dissatisfaction may depend on outcomes, it is likely that before a suit is
lodged, some consideration is given to the other potential explanations for a
poor outcome. Thus, a poor patient outcome for a low-risk case may be more
likely to result in a suit than a similarly poor outcome for a very high-risk case.
Unfortunately, severity adjustments for patient outcomes are not yet well
developed, and there are no reliable and valid measures of risk-adjusted
outcomes at the hospital level. 20 It is possible, however, to develop risk-
16. These linkages are, of course, hypothetical. Sloan, et al, found that in some cases board-
certified physicians were actually more likely to have suits filed against them. Sloan, et al, 262J Am
Med Ass'n at 3296-97 (cited in note 6). Conversely, others have found mortality rates to be lower in
hospitals with a higher percentage of board-certified physicians. See, for example, ArthurJ. Hartz, et
al, Hospital Characteristics and Mortalitv Rates, 321 New EngJ Med 1720, 1722 (1989).
17. See Ann Berry Flood, et al, Effectiveness in Professional Organizations: The inpact of Surgeons and
Surgical Organizations on the Quality oJ Care in Hospitals, 17 Health Serv Res 341, 350 (Winter 1982).
18. See Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 19-29 (cited in note 3).
19. See Luft. et al, Hospital Iolume at 9-30 (cited in note 15).
20. See Lisa 1. lezzoni, Illness Measures: Comments and Caveats, 28 Med Care 757, 760 (1990).
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adjusted measures for selected groups of patients. We have used such
approaches in examining the relationship between volume and outcome
across large numbers of hospitals. 2 1 Other researchers have developed
similar approaches. 22
II
DATA AND METHODS
Because of the exploratory nature of the investigation, we focused our
attention on data available from public sources for a reasonably large number
of hospitals. This approach eliminated the need for permission from each
hospital, with the attendant likelihood that agreement to participate might be
related to self-perceived risk associated with a poor record of malpractice
claims. The data for this study were derived from several sources and linked
for analytic purposes. The major data sets used were: claims files from a
large insurance carrier; the American Hospital Association ("AHA") annual
survey of hospitals; 23 discharge abstract data from the California Office of
Statewide Health Planning and Development; 24 and linked birth and death
certificate information provided by the Maternal and Child Health Database at
the University of California at Santa Barbara.25
A. Characteristics of Malpractice Claims Data
Throughout this discussion, we have focused on risk factors that may affect
the occurrence and magnitude of hospital malpractice claims. Obviously, the
risk factors and the claims should relate to approximately the same point in
time. This means that the claims data should be on an occurrence basis,
rather than a paid basis, because settlement of a case may take years or even
decades. Data for claims occurring in the period 1984-88 were provided by an
insurance carrier covering a large number of hospitals in California.2 6
The data indicated the location of the event and a description of the event.
If the claim had been settled, the amount paid was indicated; if not, an
estimated payment was placed in reserve. Given the experience of the
insurer, the reserve amount should be a reasonable estimate of the ultimate
21. See generally Luft, et al. Hospital Volume (cited in note 15); Jonathan A. Showstack, et al.
Association of Volume with Outcome of CoronaryArtery' Bypass Graft Surgery, 257J Am Med Ass'n 785 (1987);
Harold S. Luft, Sandra S. Hunt & Susan C. Maerki, The Volume-Outcome Relationship: Practice Makes
Perfect or Selective Referral Patterns?, 22 Health Serv Res 157 (1987).
22. See, for example, Mark S. Blumberg, Risk Adjusting Health Care Outcomes: A Methodological
Review, 43 Med Care Rev 351 (1986): Susan DesHarnais, et al, The Risk-Adjusted Mortality Index: .4 NVew
Measure of Hospital Performance, 26 Med Care 1129 (1988).
23. See Am Hosp Ass'n, The American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals (Am Hosp
Ass'n, 1987).
24. See California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development, Discharge Data
Program (1986).
25. Data base compiled for 1985 by the Community and Organization Research Institute at the
University of California. Santa Barbara.
26. Data were supplied by the Truck Insurance Exchange and Sullivan, Kelly and Associates,
Inc., Los Angeles, California. However, they bear no responsibility for interpretation or conclusions
arising from this research project.
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cost of the claim. Use of reserve data incorporates additional uncertainty in
the estimates, but it also reduces the variability across hospitals and allows an
estimate of the full experience for the time period.
To maintain confidentiality, hospital identifiers were not included with the
data provided by the insurer. However, information on geographic location
and approximate size were provided, which allowed us to match hospitals with
similar characteristics using the AHA data. The insurer provided data for the
292 hospitals it covered out of the 476 hospitals in California. Of these, fifty
were dropped because a reasonable match could not be identified, or, if a
match was made, no data were reported by the hospital to the AHA. (These
were usually very small hospitals or those open for only a short time.) In
addition, twenty-two hospitals were omitted because they were not short-term
general hospitals, and four were excluded because either census or claims
figures were implausible. The total number of hospitals included in the
analysis was 212. As discussed below in Part IIB, they are reasonably
representative of the range of hospitals in the state.
The claims files included all claims covered by the insurer, including
nonmedical care events such as "patient's stolen belongings," and events
occurring outside the institution, such as at a parenting class held at another
location. Such claims were excluded from the analysis. More importantly,
malpractice claims are characterized by a large number of relatively small
claims and a small number of very large claims. This highly skewed
distribution is difficult to incorporate in analytic models; further, if one does
attempt to do so, there is a substantial risk that the results will be dominated
by one or two hospitals with very large claims.2 7 To address this issue, we
"capped" individual claims at $100,000 each and noted the number of such
claims at each hospital. Total claims amounted to $142,476,167; when
limited to $100,000 claims, they totalled $104,765,323. Thus, we have
implicitly assigned about 26 percent of claims dollars to a stop-loss pool.
While we chose this approach for analytic purposes, it is not unlike that used
in the industry in which an insurer reinsures or a hospital self-insures for
claims of less than a certain amount.
B. Characteristics of American Hospital Association Data
The AHA conducts an annual survey of all hospitals in the United States
regardless of their membership in the association. 28 Over 80 percent of all
California hospitals responded to the survey in 1986, and most variables are
publicly available. To coincide with the 1984-88 claims data, we used data
from the 1986 Annual Survey. Table I presents means and standard
deviations for the AHA variables for the hospitals included in the analysis and
for all California hospitals.
27. See Jacob Cohen & Patricia Cohen, Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the
Behavioral Sciences 127-28 (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2d ed 1983).
28. See The American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals (cited in note 23).
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TABLE 1
MEAN VALUES FOR HOSPITALS INCLUDED IN SAMPLE AND ALL
CALIFORNIA ACUTE-CARE HOSPITALS
Hospitals Included in
Analyses (212)
All California Acute-
Care Hospitals (467)
181.6
113.0
6,527.9
41,146.7
21.4
13.8
10.8
8.5
2.8
93.4
20.2
7.0
20.7
68.1
14.1
5.2
# Beds
Average Daily Census (ADC)
# Admissions Per Year
# Inpatient Days Per Year
# Intensive Care Beds
Intensive Care Unit Census
(ICU patient days/365)
% For Profit
% Public
% Children's
% with 24-hr Emergency
% with Level 2 Neonatal Intensive
Care Unit (NICU)
% with Level 3 NICU
% with MD liaison
% MDs Board Certified
% Medical School Affiliation
% Membership in Council of
Teaching Hospitals
# Inpatient Surgeries Per Year
# Ambulatory Surgeries Per Year
# ER Visits Per Year
# Clinic Visits Per Year
# Births Per Year
% Patients with Medicaid or
No Insurance
% Responding to AHA Survey
Dependent Variables
# Claims per Year 7.3'
# Large Claims per Year 0.4
Adjusted Claims Cost per Year 191,133
Average # of Years Covered 3.71
* Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
2474.0
1683.5
16,156.6
31,871.5
950.3
23.8
(128.03)*
(92.91)
(5,232.75)
(33,967.67)
(24.15)
(18.72)
193.9
109.1
6,357.9
39,705.4
23.4
16.8
(157.56)
(117.58)
(6,628.30)
(42,977.57)
(27.26)
(22.22)
31.0
8.1
1.3
76.4
15.6
8.8
19.2
65.5
13.9
5.4
(2,103.27)
(1,281.85)
(11,713.04)
(37,063.90)
(1,168.79)
2355.5
1596.7
16,349.2
33,469.1
964.6
24.2
(2,210.65)
(1,596.73)
(17,638.31)
(58,619.04)
(1,458.54)
81.6
7
2
8
(8.76)
(0.62)
(249,200)
(1.63)
The hospitals included in the study are similar in size, admissions, patient
days, public ownership, teaching status, and percentage of patients with
Medicaid or no insurance coverage. Only a few important differences
between the groups are apparent. There were substantially fewer for-profit
hospitals in our sample (11 percent versus 31 percent for the state). This may
be explained by the fact that members of large for-profit chains are more
likely to be insured by the parent corporation. In addition, more hospitals in
our sample had 24-hour emergency departments (93 percent versus 76
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percent) and level 2 obstetric care units. 29 These differences may arise from
the lower proportion of for-profit hospitals in our sample. For-profit
hospitals, in general, are less likely to offer such services. 30 Thus, while we
are not attempting to generalize our results to the entire population of
California hospitals, our sample does include a broad range of hospitals.
C. Outcome Variables
The AHA data are quite straightforward and commonly used in studies of
hospital performance. The outcome variables are more novel, although each
has been used before.
Since the early 1970s, risk-adjusted perinatal mortality rates for each
hospital in the state have been published. 3' These data are developed by
linking birth and death certificates so that perinatal deaths are attributed to
the hospital of birth, irrespective of where the death occurs. The expected
number of deaths for each hospital is derived from its case mix of births by
race, gender, birth weight, and number of multiple deliveries. Using the
binomial distribution, a Z-score is computed for each hospital. 32 Positive Z-
scores indicate higher-than-expected mortality rates (with values of 1.96 or
more being significant statistically), and negative scores represent lower-than-
expected rates. This Z-score includes a measure of both the extent to which
the outcomes for the hospital deviate from the expected value and the
likelihood that such deviations are due to chance. 33
Another type of hospital outcome has been used to examine a variety of
research questions. Actual mortality rates have been calculated for a set of
four surgical procedures (hysterectomy, cholecystectomy, total hip
replacement, and transurethral resection of prostate) and four medical
diagnoses (acute myocardial infarction, pneumonia, stroke, and fractured
femur) for all patients in California, using discharge data compiled by the
California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development. 34 Rates of
general and related complications were also identified for the surgical
procedures.3 5 Risk equations were computed in which patient characteristics,
such as age, gender, and chronic conditions, were used to predict bad
29. A level I obstetric unit provides services for uncomplicated maternity and newborn cases. A
level 2 unit provides services for all uncomplicated and most complicated cases and special neonatal
services. A level 3 unit provides services for all serious illnesses and abnormalities. See Am Hosp
Ass'n, 1985 Annual Survey of Hospitals 12 (Am Hosp Ass'n, 1986).
30. This was determined from analysis of the 1985 AHA data, id.
31. See Community and Organization Research Institute, 1982-1986 Maternal and Child Health:
Data Base Descriptive Narrative and 1982-1986 Maternal and Child Health: Data Base Statistical Appendix
(University of California, Santa Barbara, July 1990).
32. The binomial distribution was used to calculate the probability that the observed number of
deaths would occur by chance given the expected number of deaths. The normal distribution is then
used to convert the probability to a Z-score measured in standard deviation units.
33. See Ronald L. Williams, .lleaswing the Effectiveness of Pertnatal Medical Care, 17 Med Care 95
(1979).
34. See Harold S. Luft, et al, Does Qualityv Influence Choice of Hospital?, 263 J Am Med Ass'n 2899
(1990).
35. Id.
RISK FACTORS
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
outcomes, such as death or complications. These equations were then used to
predict bad-outcome rates at specific hospitals, based on each hospital's case
mix. In a manner similar to that used by Williams,3 6 observed bad outcomes
at each hospital were compared with the predicted number of bad outcomes,
and Z-scores were calculated. Each surgical procedure, therefore, has a
mortality Z-score, a related complication Z-score, and a general complication
Z-score for 1984, 1985, and 1986; medical diagnoses have only mortality Z-
scores for each year.3 7
In an attempt to summarize the outcome data into a smaller number of
variables, a factor analysis was used. Factor analysis is a statistical method in
which the correlations among variables are assumed to be due to some
common underlying factor or factors.3 8 Once a factor is identified through
statistical examination of intercorrelations, factor loadings are determined.
Factor loadings are, in essence, correlations of each variable with the
hypothesized factor or factors, which can be used to calculate factor scores for
each observation. These factor scores provide an aggregate measure of
common characteristics associated with selected underlying patterns.
Two factors were identified that accounted for 23 percent of the variation
in Z-scores.3 9 One factor consisted primarily of the complication scores; the
other consisted primarily of mortality scores.
D. Exclusions and Other Data Considerations
Particular problems arise when examining data that are known to be
somewhat "dirty" and for which it is impossible to check the accuracy of
certain variables. For example, one hospital had a reported average daily
census of one patient, and three had very large claims totals in quite short
periods of coverage. These hospitals had undue influence on the regression
results as measured by their calculated leverages. 40 As indicated above, these
hospitals were excluded from the analyses because of the strong likelihood of
errors in the data, but it is possible the data were, in fact, accurate. Obviously,
implementation of any of these findings should be preceded by a replication
with additional data.
A second problem arising from these data is associated with the varying
time period of coverage. This ranged from a few months to a maximum of the
five years comprised within the 1984-88 period. While we present claims on
an annualized basis, not all claims are reported immediately, so it is possible
that some claims for 1988 have not yet been reported. Claims for 1984 are
36. See Williams, 17 Med Care at 97-100 (cited in note 33).
37. At the time this analysis was undertaken, 1987 and 1988 data were not vet available.
38. See Jae-On Kim & Charles W. Mueller, Introduction to Factor Analysis." Uhat It Is and How To Do
It 9-22 (Sage Publications, 1978) (Number 13 in the Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences
Series).
39. Although forty-eight factors were necessary to account for all variation, the first two factors
were selected because they accounted for the largest proportion of variation.
40. See Paul F. Velleman, Data Desk Statistics Guide, Volume 11, at 23.6-23.10 (Quark XPress,
1989).
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more likely to be complete or at least reported to the insurer. Obviously, a
hospital with five years of coverage will have a range of completeness.
Unfortunately, we do not know whether a hospital with only one year of
coverage is reporting data for 1984 or 1988, or for some period in between.
Furthermore, one might question why a hospital has been covered by this
insurer for only a short period of time. Perhaps those hospitals with short
spells of coverage are either switching carriers to obtain lower premiums or
are being dropped by another carrier because of high claims experience.
Thus, even though the focus is on the claims experience per covered year, the
number of years of coverage may be a useful variable.
III
RESULTS
We performed several analyses. First, we explored whether the variables
thought to have an impact on claims experience actually had a statistically
significant effect. Second, we pared down the list of variables to a more
parsimonious group that might at some stage be used by carriers to set
premiums and by hospital managers to focus their attention on areas of
increased risk for claims. Within these two broad groupings, we considered
several measures of malpractice-claims experience: first, the total dollars paid
or allocated, perhaps with adjustments for very large claims; second, the
number of claims; and, third, the number of large claims. The total claims
measures indicate the expected cost or exposure. From a management
perspective, however, the implications of ten $50,000 claims may be quite
different than those of one $500,000 claim, so the number of claims may be an
indicator of the frequency of problems. The number of large claims is
important because a hospital wishing to self-insure for most costs may still
want coverage for the very high-cost claims.
Table 2 presents the regression results for the 212 hospitals using as the
dependent variable the adjusted expected claims cost per covered year. 4 1 The
expected claims cost per year includes both paid claims and reserves set aside
for unpaid claims. To calculate this variable, we capped each claim at
$100,000 and kept count of the number of claims exceeding $100,000 at each
hospital. On average, the amount in excess of this figure was $90,140 for each
large claim. This amount was then added back into each hospital's total cost
for each claim it experienced over $100,000. In other words, instead of
attempting to model the highly skewed distribution of claims, we assumed
that every claim of more than $99,999 was exactly $190,140. The number of
large claims per hospital, however, was unchanged (this varied from zero to
fifteen with a mean of 1.82). The total adjusted expected claims figure was
then divided by the number of covered years to arrive at the adjusted
expected claims cost per year of coverage.
41. The first set of columns presents results for all the variables in the model, whereas the
second set of columns includes just a subset of the variables.
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TABLE 2
REGRESSIONS ON ADJUSTED CLAIMS COST PER YEAR OF COVERAGE
Constant
Average daily census
ICU census
Children's hospital
For-profit ownership
Public ownership
Medical school, nonCOTH
COTH member
Births
High risk NICU, level 2
High risk NICU, level 3
Surgical operations, inpatient
Surgical operations, outpatient
Emergency room visits
Other outpatient visits
RNs per average daily census
Other nurses per average daily census
Contract physician liaison
Percent of medical staff board certified
Covered years
Covered less than 1 year
Number of cases
Adjusted R2
* p <.05
**p <.01
Full Model
Coefficient t-ratio
53,942 0.53
605 1.56
2,655 1.82
313,116 2.78**
110,101 2.24*
7,829 0.14
-64,407 1.11
25,819 0.29
-10.16 0.45
29,775 0.77
167,358 2.45*
18.13 1.06
31.49 1.80
0.64 0.37
-0.92 1.58
-4,683 0.12
-48,147 0.59
-84,456 2.30*
-38,147 0.37
26,501 2.39*
15,428 0.25
212
.380
Parsimonious Model
Coefficient t-ratio
-87,808 2.13*
644 1.89
2,651 2.01*
305,252 3.13**
109,612 2.36*
-58,788 1.18
148,788
16.33
30.40
2.70*
1.08
1.88
-0.78 1.54
-83,618
25,938
2.36*
2.94**
A. Hospital Size and Characteristics
The regression results presented in Table 2 provide strong support for the
notion that hospital characteristics, such as those included in this model, can
help explain malpractice claims experience. In fact, as indicated by the R-
square value, they "explained" 38 percent of the variation in annual
malpractice claims expense across hospitals. Looking at the first pair of
columns in Table 2, average daily census was positively associated with claims
CoStS, 4 2 with each extra patient implying additional costs of $605, 4 3 although
this coefficient was not statistically different from zero at conventional levels.
In contrast, for each additional patient in an intensive care unit ("ICU") on an
average day, the claims costs would rise by $2,655. Put another way, a
patient-day in an ICU was associated with more than four times the
malpractice expense of a patient-day in standard care.
42. The t-ratio is substantially less than 1.96, the value indicating that there is only a 5% chance
of observing a coefficient that large when there is no true effect. Smaller t-ratios indicate a greater
likelihood that the observed results are merely due to chance.
43. Note that this effect is based on a cost per census or bed filled on a year-round basis, not a
cost per patient-day. The cost per day is $605/365 or $1.66 for each patient-day.
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Several of the risk factors are categorical variables, meaning that a hospital
is either in the category or not. For example, hospitals specializing in
pediatric care have additional annual malpractice expenses of $313,116. It is
important to note that this characteristic pertains to children's hospitals, not
general acute-care hospitals with pediatric units. The high claims risk partly
reflects the fact that these specialty hospitals tend to have very high-risk
patients; and, if there is a problem with a child, the potential claims may be
quite large. There are only six children's hospitals in our data, so these
results may be idiosyncratic.
Hospitals with for-profit ownership had malpractice claims of nearly
$100,000 per year more than did the reference category, not-for-profit
hospitals. Public hospitals had malpractice claims experience essentially the
same as the not-for-profits. Two categories of teaching hospitals were also
examined. The first level contains those hospitals affiliated with a medical
school. The second, more sophisticated level, is indicated by membership in
the Council of Teaching Hospitals ("COTH"). Hospitals affiliated with a
medical school had lower malpractice costs, and COTH members higher
costs, but neither figure is statistically significant.
B. Service and Volume Factors
Given the high dollar amount of claims associated with newborns, we
expected the number of births to be associated with increased claims costs. In
fact, the number of births had essentially no effect on claims. The presence of
a level 3, high-risk obstetric care unit,4 4 however, was associated with
significantly higher costs of $167,358 per year.
Each inpatient surgical procedure was associated with an expected claims
cost of about $18, while each additional outpatient surgical procedure was
associated with additional cost of $31.49. Neither figure, however, was
significant at conventional levels. Additional emergency room visits had no
effect on claims costs. In contrast, other outpatient visits seemed associated
with lower costs, although the effect was insignificant.
C. Staffing and Organizational Factors
Staffing and organizational characteristics of the hospitals generally had
little effect. Neither the ratio of registered nurses ("RNs") per average daily
census ("ADC") nor the ratio of non-RN nursing personnel per ADC had an
effect on claims costs. The presence of a contractual arrangement for a
physician liaison between the hospital and the medical staff was associated
with lower malpractice costs. The magnitude of this effect ($84,456), if borne
out in other analyses, suggests that the costs of such an arrangement could be
offset in lower risk-adjusted premiums.
As anticipated, hospitals with more years of coverage by the insurer had
claims costs higher by approximately $26,501 per year. On the other hand,
44. For definitions of levels of obstetric care, see note 29.
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hospitals with less than a year coverage seemed no different from other
hospitals.45
D. A More Parsimonious Model
The preceding set of results was designed to test the possible effect of
variables plausibly associated with claims experience. While several of the
variables had the expected effect and were statistically significant, others were
found to have no effect. For the purposes of designing risk-adjusted
premiums, the nonsignificant variables contribute nothing and may actually
be detrimental. 46 In the second set of columns in Table 2, regression results
are presented in which variables from the first regression with t-ratios of less
than 1.00 were omitted and the regression re-estimated.
The exclusion of insignificant variables raised the adjusted R-square from
.380 to .403, indicating that over 40 percent of the variability in claims costs
was explained by the included risk factors. With one minor exception-the
number of inpatient surgical procedures-the level of significance for each of
the included variables, as measured by the t-ratio, increased. Even though a t-
ratio of 1.0 was used as the criterion for inclusion, eight of the eleven
coefficients under the "parsimonious model" are significant at conventional
levels (t > 1.96, p <.05), and the coefficient for ADC is nearly significant.
E. Objective Outcome Measures
Table 3 presents the results of adding our objective measures of patient
outcomes to the "parsimonious" equation shown in column 2 of Table 2. An
important limitation of this part of our analysis is that the three outcome
measures are available only for 111 of the 212 hospitals. This reduction in
sample size has two implications. First, with fewer observations it becomes
more difficult to detect small but consistent patterns in the face of substantial
random variability. Second, the subsample of hospitals is not a random one-
observations are dropped for hospitals that had no patients in the
subcategories required to form the factor scores or measures of perinatal
outcomes. Thus, the smaller and more specialized hospitals are
disproportionately omitted. For example, none of the children's hospitals is
included in this smaller sample.47
45. Recall, however, that three hospitals appearing to have very short coverage periods and very
large claims costs were excluded from the final sample.
46. The problems would arise from, first, the need to collect additional data that are irrelevant
and therefore make the whole system more cumbersome, and, second, the possibility that some of
the insignificant variables have large coefficients, which add random noise to the premium. That is, a
hospital would find its premium being raised or lowered by substantial amounts for characteristics
not clearly related to malpractice costs.
47. While the children's hospitals have neonatal-care units, they do not have experience with the
adult cases used to form the factor scores for the other patient outcomes, nor do they, in general,
offer obstetric services.
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TABLE 3
ADJUSTED CLAIMS COST PER YEAR OF COVERAGE
INCLUDING OUTCOME VARIABLES
Parsimonious Model
Constant
Average daily census
ICU census
For-profit ownership
Medical school, nonCOTH
High risk NICU, level 3
Surgical operations, inpatient
Surgical operations, outpatient
Other outpatient visits
Contractual physician liaison
Covered years
Factor 1, complications
Factor 2, mortality
ZPMR, perinatal mortality
Number of cases
Adjusted R2
* p <.05
**p <.01
Coefficient
-127,974
690
4,338
96,694
-160,522
204,164
-3.09
34.72
-0.78
-79,222
41,786
t-ratio
1.79
1.19
2.42*
0.92
2.12'
2.92**
0.14
1.56
1.13
1.40
2.87**
Outcome F
Scores
Coefficient
-126,646
728
4,227
71,425
-161,785
188,977
-0.58
32.15
-0.80
-74,307
42,654
32,598
-7,694
Factor
Perinatal Mortality
t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
1.74 -126,624 1.73
1.25 730 1.24
2.35* 4,242 2.35*
0.67 75,122 0.70
2.12* -165,004 2.13'
2.67** 194,272 2.65**
0.03 -0.83 0.04
1.42 32.26 1.41
1.16 -0.76 1.07
1.31 -74,447 1.30
2.93** 42,244 2.87**
1.39 32,698 1.39
0.36 -7,527 0.35
5,621 0.30
111
.357
The first pair of columns of Table 3 should be compared with the second
pair of columns of Table 2. With the exception of the children's hospital
variable, they should be identical except for the loss of observations. In fact,
while the general pattern of effects was similar, the coefficients in Table 3
were often less significant statistically, reflecting the reduced number of
observations. The second pair of columns in Table 3 adds the two factor
scores based on hospital experience with selected groups of patients for 1984-
86. The first factor score, which essentially represents complication rates
adjusted for patient risk factors, was positively associated with claims
experience. The second factor, which represents mortality rates adjusted for
patient risk factors, was unrelated to claims experience. In the third set of
results, the Z-score based on perinatal mortality adjusted for risk factors was
also unrelated to claims costs.
F. Other Measures of Claims Experience
Although the dollar amount of paid losses and reserves set aside against
known claims is probably the figure most useful in setting premium rates, risk
factors associated with the number of claims per year and the number of large
claims may be more useful for hospital management. 48 Table 4 presents the
results for these regressions using the full sample of 212 hospitals and the
variables included in the "parsimonious" regression of Table 2.
48. Recall that the figures for large claims are based on actual payments or reserves established
by the insurer of $100,000 or more, not the plaintiffs' requests.
RISK FACTORS
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
In many ways, the findings for number of claims per year were quite
similar to the costs associated with those claims. Higher overall ADC and ICU
census were associated with more claims. For-profit ownership and the
presence of high-risk neonatal care were associated with substantially higher
numbers of claims, an additional 4.9 and 9.0 claims respectively. These
figures should be considered in the context of an average number of claims
per year of 8.4. Interestingly, children's hospitals did not have an above-
average number of claims per year.
TABLE 4
NUMBER OF CLAIMS
Constant
Average daily census
ICU census
Children's hospital
For-profit ownership
Medical school
High risk NICU, level 3
Surgical operations, inpatient
Surgical operations, outpatient
Other outpatient visits
Contractual physician liaison
Covered years
Number of cases
Adjusted R2
AND NUMBER OF LARGE
COVERAGE
Claims/Year
Coefficient t-ratio
-2.104 1.52
.024 2.09*
.080 1.81
-. 384 0.12
4.850 3.11*
1.117 0.67
8.979 4.86**
.00078 1.54
.00069 1.27
-.00004 2.61 * *
-1.595 1.34
.794 2.68**
212
.455
CLAIMS PER YEAR OF
Claims> $1 00,00/Year
Coefficient t-ratio
-.2160 2.01
.0015 1.71
.0048 1.41
.9650 3.80**
.1239 1.02
-.2227 1.71
.3015 2.10*
.00003 0.64
.00009 2.05*
-.0000008 0.58
-.2090 2.27*
.0600 2.61**
* p <.05
**p <.01
The second set of columns in Table 4 presents the risk factors for the
number of claims per covered year with expected costs of $100,000 or more.
In contrast to the results with respect to total claims costs and number of
claims, for-profit hospitals were no different from voluntary hospitals in the
number of large claims. However, children's hospitals, while having an
average number of claims per year, were much more likely than other
hospitals to have large claims. The presence of high-risk obstetric care units
was also associated with more large claims. While the number of inpatient
surgical procedures had no effect on the number of large claims, the number
of outpatient procedures was associated significantly with the occurrence of
large claims. This outcome may reflect the fact that while malpractice claims
are often associated with surgery, it is usually in the context of physician
rather than hospital liability. However, if an outpatient procedure results in a
poor outcome, the hospital may be at greater risk.
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IV
DISCUSSION
A. Comments
Given the lack of previously published work on risk factors for hospital
malpractice claims, and the relatively simple variables such as ADC used by
insurers in setting premiums, we were prepared to find that none of the
potential risk factors was associated with claims experience. Furthermore,
studies of physician risk factors suggested that the distribution of claims
experience is so skewed and so random as to preclude useful analysis. 49 We
capped claims at $100,000 each and substituted the average cost of capped
claims to improve both our ability to develop estimates and to approximate
excess limits insurance pools. 50
The number of covered years often appeared as a significant variable in
the regressions even though the dependent variables were annualized based
on the number of covered months. This result suggests that one should first
determine exactly when a hospital began and ended coverage and then take
into account the number of years from this window of coverage to the cutoff
point for inclusion of claims in the data set. The underlying data are available
to the insurer, so such an investigation would not be difficult. While doing
this, the insurer could transform the data into yearly observations to allow for
changes in hospital characteristics over time. This method may improve the
predictive power of those variables most likely to change, such as ADC,
surgical procedures, and outcomes.
Children's hospitals and those with high-risk obstetric care units had
substantially higher claims experience. As there were only six children's
hospitals in our sample, these results may not be generalizable. A review of
the nature of the individual claims could confirm or refute the apparent
association for these hospitals. Likewise, it would be useful to examine only
the claims associated with labor and delivery in all hospitals to determine
whether hospitals with high-risk units have greater exposure to malpractice
claims. It is plausible that they do, even though their care may be better. This
apparent inconsistency could arise for several reasons. First, hospitals with
level 3 units have much higher numbers of high-risk cases. Thus, even if their
rate of claims per high-risk delivery is far below the average, they will have a
higher number of claims than the average hospital. Second, the specialized
49. The distribution of claims across physicians makes it difficult to estimate the importance of
risk factors because most physicians are not sued in any particular year, see Patricia M. Danzon, The
Frequency' and Seveny ] Aledial Malpractie Claims. .Vew Evidence, 49 L & Contemp Prohs 57 (Spring
1986); Frank A. Sloan, et al. 2651 Am Med Ass'n at 3293 (cited in note 6), and idiosyncratic factors
often underlie the filing of a claim. See Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 19-24 (cited in note 3); James
W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder. Evaltinag Medical Malpractice Refiom-s, 7 Contemp Pol'v Issues 83-85
(1989). Fortunatelv. from a statistical perspective, hospitals are subject to many more claims per
year. so some of the random variability is reduced.
50. The reserves incorporate the insurers' expectations that the case will be lost and about the
amount of the award. thus producing an expected value not unlike an actuarial estimate. The
difference is that the reserves are based on the insurers' interpretation of each case.
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level 3 units may be able to avoid neonatal death, but many of the survivors
have long-term disabilities. Because the pregnancy was high-risk, perhaps
because of premature delivery, a death may be likely to result in a smaller
settlement than would an outcome that left the patient alive but handicapped.
The lack of an association between the perinatal mortality rate and the
claims rate is surprising. One possible explanation is that the smaller sample
created by the matching of files reduced our statistical power to detect an
effect. More importantly, there is little reason in hindsight to expect that
hospitals with higher-than-average perinatal mortality rates would have
higher total claims. Instead, a more precise test would focus on the hospitals'
experiences with claims associated with labor and delivery and newborn care.
Also, awards associated with delivery are usually borne by the obstetrician
rather than the hospital, even though both may be named in the suit.
We had even weaker expectations for the factor scores as measures of risk,
in part because the scores are based on a relatively small sample of
procedures and diagnoses. The figures are also based on data pooled over a
three-year period, thereby weakening the impact of year-to-year variations
that could affect claims. The result for the complication-related factor score,
however, suggests a relation between objective measures of poor patient
outcomes and claims experience, and thus merits further investigation.
Additional data would allow more careful estimation of the relationship
between these risk factors and claims experience. For example, it may be
better to estimate the regression using the log of the dependent variables and
then retransform the results to unlogged form. Nonlinear effects may also be
important. For example, the presence of any outpatient surgery might carry
an increased risk of claims, and the marginal effect of additional procedures a
smaller effect. Similar nonlinear effects may be present for other variables,
but more precise data are needed to test their importance.
In general, as with any exploratory study, these results should be evaluated
with some caution. If they were preceded by several similar sets of findings
using other data, we could be more confident about their reliability. 5' In spite
of these caveats, these results lead to implications for further research, and, if
one is willing to assume the findings are replicated by further studies, to
policy implications.
B. Policy Implications
The underlying rationale for exploring risk factors associated with
malpractice experience is to strengthen incentives to provide better care. As
discussed above, first-dollar insurance coverage reduces the hospital's
51. The presence of many statistically significant results does not alter this interpretation.
These statistical tests mean that the observed coefficients are unlikely to have been observed by
chance if the true coefficients were zero for a population represented by this set of observations.
While chance relationships are always a concern, the more substantive question is whether the claims
experiences of these California hospitals covered by one large insurer during the mid-1980s are
representative of other hospitals in other situations.
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incentives to exercise caution and attempt to improve quality. Of course,
there is always the threat that coverage may be terminated or premium
surcharges may be imposed due to "excessive" claims experience, but even
this signal occurs after the fact. Before the termination or surcharge, many
hospital administrators may not know that their hospital's experience is
abnormal. Although the introduction of substantial deductibles increases the
hospital's incentives to improve quality and avoid claims through risk-
management activities, these measures are still largely concurrent or
retrospective in nature: that is, they take place only after problems are
identified.
Structural measures, such as hospital type, presence of specialized
facilities, and number of patients, are readily measured and easily
incorporated, at least in theory, in setting premiums. Thus, it would not be
too large a step for insurers to include these characteristics in setting
premiums. To see how risk factors might be used, suppose that the results
presented for the "parsimonious regression" in Table 2 are accurate and
reliable-that is, such results were replicated in other data sets and with
hospitals in other states. For example, suppose a hospital has an ADC equal
to the sample average, 113. This yields an incremental premium of 113 X
$644 = $72,772. Each year of coverage adds $25,938, so a hospital with 3.7
covered years (the average for the sample) would add $95,971, for a subtotal
of $168,743. Combining this number with the negative intercept (-87,808)
yields a premium of $80,935, assuming the hospital has none of the other
characteristics. 5 2
Some hospitals in the sample perform no surgical procedures; this is far
from common, however, so assume that this "average" hospital has 2,474
inpatient procedures. This would add $40,400 to the annual premium cost
(2,474 x $16.33). Moreover, the hospital administrator should pass on the
additional $16.33 cost in the operating room charge. Outpatient procedures
are more discretionary and carry nearly twice the malpractice premium cost.
An average outpatient procedure load would add $51,178 to the annual
premium (31,871.5 X $30.40). While an experience-rated hospital would
bear this cost, the administration probably has no estimate of such additional
expense when deciding to offer such services.
Some practices, on the other hand, can reduce malpractice costs. The
development of contractual relationships and a physician liaison between the
medical staff and the hospital could reduce premiums by $83,618. Obviously,
merely signing a contract and placing a nameplate on the door are not
associated with lower malpractice risks. The insurer and the hospital
management would have to determine what really distinguishes effective from
ineffective liaisons. Whatever it is, the cost difference is substantial. Likewise,
52. The negative intercept seems implausible, but it would be relevant only for hospitals with
values of zero for all the other variables in the regression, including ADC, years of coverage, and
surgical operations. In fact, the effect of the negative intercept is to reproduce the minimal claims
experience of very small hospitals.
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the development of active nonemergency outpatient care is associated with
lower malpractice costs. While a savings of $0.78 per visit is small, the cost of
a visit is also relatively small; and with an average of 31,872 visits per year, the
savings are substantial ($24,860). Perhaps more significantly, outpatient
services lower, rather than raise, malpractice costs. 53
Each additional occupied bed in an intensive care unit on a year-round
basis would increase premium costs by $2,651. While intensive care units
may be necessary for the average hospital, 14 percent of our sample had no
ICU patients. Moreover, this result may suggest that more appropriate use of
the ICU may lead to some savings without putting at risk those patients really
in need of intensive monitoring. 54
The clearest discretionary variable is the presence of a high-risk obstetric
care unit. This variable is associated with additional malpractice costs of over
$148,000 per year. While substantial, this type of lump sum cost may be
appropriate. 55 It places a hurdle in front of hospitals considering the
development of such a unit without reasonable expectations of a large
number of patients. Large level 3 units could spread this extra cost over many
patients, so the marginal premium is small relative to the other costs
associated with staffing such a unit.
The implicit premium surcharge of $109,612 for proprietary hospitals is
different from the others; it is unclear why this has been observed. Much
more research is needed to understand why for-profit hospitals experience
more claims and claims expense, even after controlling for the other factors.
If it is due to poorer quality control or other organizational factors, attention
should be focused directly on these factors. If, however, it is based on greater
ease of winning cases against for-profit institutions because ofjury bias, other
remedies going well beyond hospital self-help and experience rating are
appropriate. 56
This discussion is intended to show how information on risk factors might
enable hospitals to avoid services and activities associated with higher risks
while encouraging measures that would reduce the risk of malpractice claims.
Such a policy, however, could be carried too far. One would not want all
hospitals to shut down level 3 obstetric units, because these have been shown
to reduce mortality and morbidity among high-risk infants. Instead, one
would use the insurance premiums to deter small, inefficient units that may
also have worse-than-average outcomes while encouraging those hospitals
able to deliver high-quality perinatal care. Likewise, the risk adjustments
must be based on "real" factors that cannot be manipulated. For example,
53. We tested whether this effect was associated with lower income clientele by including the
proportion of the hospitals' inpatients who are covered by Medicaid or have no insurance. While it
may be poorly measured, this variable had no effect on the estimate.
54. See Kim A. Eagle, et al, Length of Stay in the Intensive Care Unit: Effects of Practice Guidelines and
Feedback, 264 J Am Med Ass'n 992, 996 (1990).
55. We were unable to obtain data to test for a volume effect.
56. On the question ofjury bias, see Randall R. Bovbjerg, et alJuries and Justice: Are Malpractice
and Other Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 L & Contemp Probs 5 (Winter 1991).
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the redesignation of a children's hospital as a general acute-care hospital does
not change the reality if its case mix continues to consist of very sick children.
Again, it may be that for their case mix of patients, children's hospitals have
better outcomes than general acute-care hospitals; they merely have a
concentration of particularly high-cost cases. Thus, any use of risk factors
would have to be tempered with logic and an eye on social goals.
Such an approach need not be implemented at the public level.
Malpractice insurance is sold in the private market, and premiums reflecting
risk factors may confer a competitive advantage for the seller. For example, if
we abstract from loading costs, the standard premium for hospital coverage
would be based on only the ADC. The average-size hospital would face a
premium of $191,133 per year for coverage. 57 This premium would not be
adjusted based on ICU usage, surgical load, or obstetric care units. Suppose a
hospital had the average ICU and surgical load, but no outpatient surgery and
no high-risk obstetric unit. Assume also that it was not-for-profit and had a
physician serving as liaison between the medical staff and the hospital. A
carrier with risk-adjusted premiums could offer coverage for such a hospital
for only $74,301, or approximately 60 percent less than the non-risk-rated
premium.
Risk adjustment implies that some premiums are raised while others are
lowered. The carrier offering risk-adjusted premiums would have to raise the
premiums for proprietary hospitals, children's hospitals, and those without
physician liaisons. It may lose these hospitals as clients; these hospitals will
have to seek coverage from other carriers, self-insure, or alter the
characteristics that led to their higher claims experience. Some of these
characteristics may be unavoidable, as for children's hospitals and providers
of level 3 obstetric care. The higher malpractice premiums would then be
reflected in higher charges. While this concentrates the costs, it also helps
focus attention on the problems in the liability system.
Understanding the role of risk factors in malpractice costs can also allow
the hospital administrator to consider the full costs associated with decisions
to implement certain programs, such as outpatient surgery. This
consideration may reduce the attractiveness of some programs and increase
that of others. It may lead to more rational pricing of certain units. It may
also lead to more focused risk management to detect and avoid the problems
that give rise to lawsuits.
V
CONCLUSION
Our goal in this paper has been to explore whether it is possible to identify
certain variables that might serve as predictors of above- or below-average
malpractice claims experience. Using claims data from over 200 California
hospitals linked to readily available objective measures of hospital
57. This figure is derived from the average loss of all study hospitals. See Table 1.
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characteristics and performance, it is possible to identify significant risk
factors. These variables usually have plausible coefficients of reasonable
magnitudes. If hospital malpractice premiums were adjusted for such risk
factors, there would be incentives for hospitals to avoid services and activities
associated with increased risk and premiums, and to undertake efforts to
reduce risk. If hospital managers knew more about the factors associated with
increased risk of malpractice expense, they might be able to lessen that
expense. An increased understanding of risk factors would permit better use
of the liability system and its associated insurance system to improve the
quality of medical care.
